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A RENEWAL THEORETIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARD SETTING
Amitraj eet A. BatabyaJ

ABSTRACT
The process of environmental regulation is usually a two-step one. In the first step, a standard
for environmental quality is set. Then, in the second step, a regulatory mechanism is put in place to
achieve the standard. In this paper I show how renewal theory can be used to set the quality standard
optimally.
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A RENEWAL THEORETIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARD SETTING

1. Introduction

It is well known that first best solutions to problems of environmental regulation typically do
not exist. As a result, research and policy discussions have typically focussed on the design of second
best regulatory policies with certain desirable properties. In this setting, the design of environmental
policy is usually a two-step process. As Cropper and Oates (1992, p. 685) noted, " ... first, standards
or targets for environmental quality are set, and, second, a regulatory system is designed and put in
place to achieve these standards."
While a significant amount of research effort has gone into analyzing the second step of the
above-described two-step process, l economists have paid considerably less attention to the first step.
Indeed, researchers typically assume that an environmental standard has been provided exogenously;2
they then proceed to analyze the task of achieving this standard optimally. Oates, Portney, and
McGartland (1989, p. 1234) are representative. -In a study of the effects of command and control
versus incentive-based regulatory policies, these authors say that "[l]et us suppose that some standard
for environmental (or workplace) quality has been set-we take it as predetermined." This is not to
say that the standard setting task is either trivial or insignificant. A poorly set standard can lead to
inefficiencies and significant losses from regulation. 3 Given this scenario, the purpose of this paper

ISee Batabyal (1995) or Cropper and Oates (1992) for recent surveys.
2Typically on the basis of scientific dose-response relationship studies.
3For more on this in a practical setting, see Fri (1995).
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is to show how renewal theory can be used to approach the standard setting task effectively in an
explicit cost/benefit framework. 4
There are two main reasons as to why the use of renewal theory is useful. First, the
regulatory environment involves decision making in a dynamic setting marked with-in the language
ofBatabyal and Yoo (1994)-systemic uncertainty. Systemic uncertainty refers to the fact that many
of the underlying processes that a regulatory authority (RA) would like to affect have a tendency to
deteriorate probabilistically over time, if left unregulated. Second, the renewal/reward theorem-on
which more is in the next section-provides us with a useful way of: ( a) modeling the cyclical nature
of the RA's actions, and (b) characterizing the RA's objectives. I now turn to a discussion of how
to optimally set the environmental standard.

2~

The Renewal Theoretic Framework

I shall first describe the renewal/reward theorem, which will form the centerpiece for all my
subsequent analyses. 5 A stochastic process {Q(V: t ~ O} is said to be a counting process if Q(V
denotes the total number of events that have occurred by time t. Now, since Q(t-2}, Q(t-1}, Q(V, etc.,
are random, the time between any two counts Q(t-1} and Q(t-2} is also random. This time between
any two counts is called the interarrival time. A counting process in which the interarrival times have
an arbitrary distribution is called a renewal process.
Consider a renewal process {Q(V: t

~

O} with interarrival times Xq' q

~

1, which have a

distribution function F(-J. Furthermore, assume that a monetary reward Rq is earned when the qth

4Por more on renewal theory, see Karlin and Taylor (1975, pp. 167-227) or Wolff (1989, pp. 52-79).
5This discussion of the renewal/reward theorem is taken from Batabyal and Y 00 (1994).
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renewal is completed. Let R(t), the total reward earned by time t, be given by r~5:) R q

•

Let

E[Rq ]= E[R], and let E[Xq] = E[X]. The renewal/reward theorem tells us that ifE[R] and E[X] are

finite, then with probability one,
lim

E[R(t)] _ E[R]
t-H"

t

(1)

E[X] .

In other words, ifwe think ofa cycle being completed every time a renewal occurs, then the long-run
expected reward is simply the expected reward in a cycle divided by the expected time it takes to
complete that cycle.
I am now in a position to discuss the renewal theoretic approach. Let the state of the resource
system-for example, air or water-that is sought to be regulated be represented by a Brownian
motion process {S(t): t ~ O}, with mean Jlt and variance a 2t, where Jl > 0. Further, I assume that at
time to, the state of the resource system is so. The reader should think of the state at any time t, as
the level of pollutants in the resource system at that time. In other words, as the level of pollutants
increases, the quality of the resource system declines. The goal of the RA is to set a standard so as
to cap the level of pollutants at some maximum level. Let this maximum level, i.e., the standard, be
denoted by

s.
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Whenever the state of the resource system, s, reaches or exceeds S, where

s>

So ,

the RA will take action so as to bring the resource system back to some acceptable state, say state
Sa'

Note that because Jl > 0, and

s > so, if left unregulated, the state of the resource system will hit

swith probability one (Cox and Miller, 1965, p. 212). Corrective action by the RA involves social
costs and benefits. Let the monetary social costs and benefits from regulation in state s
by C(s) and B(s), respectively, where C'(S) ~ 0 , and

B'(S) ~ 0 .

6More formally, we can think of the standard as an absorbing barrier.

Let N(i)

==

=

s be given

B(i)- C(i)

be the
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social net benefit from regulation in state s. Because C('; and B('; are both increasing functions in
deciding where to set the standard, the RA will have to take into account the fact that these two
variables pull in opposite directions.
I assume that the goal of regulatory policy is to set the standard

s so as to maximize the

long-run expected net social benefit from regulation. Note that whenever S(tJ ~ S, the RA will take
action; this action successfully brings the resource system to state sa. Furthermore, this action also
involves the completion of a renewal. As a result, I can appeal to the renewal/reward theorem to
characterize the long-run expected net social benefit from such regulatory action. From (1), the
numerator is N (s) • Pr{ S(tJ ~ sIS(toJ

=

So}. Further, let the denominator be given by g(s), where

g(s) is the expected time it takes to get to state S = s. The RA's objective is to maximize over S,

(2)

g(i)

By the properties of Brownian motion processes (see Karlin and Taylor, 1975, p. 356), the
eo

f {o.j21t(t to)F exp[ {x
1

numerator of (2) can be simplified tON(S).

Jl(t to)VI202(t to)]ca. To

i-so

simplify the denominator of (2), it will be necessary to derive a differential equation satisfied by g(s).
I shall proceed as in Batabyal and Yoo (1994, pp. 239-40). Conditioning on the random variable

H = S( a) - S(O), where H denotes a change in the resource system in a small time increment a, I get
g(i) • b.

+

E[g(i-H)]

+

o(b.) ~

(3)

where 0( a) denotes the probability that the resource system will already have reached state

s in time

a . Note that H is distributed normally with mean J.l a and variance 0 2 a . Now expanding (3) in a
Taylor series, I get
- • b.
g(s)

+

[

-

E g(s) -

H g'(i)
11

+

H2 g l/(i)
21

+

1

h.o.t

+ 0

(b.) .

(4)
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Taking the expectation of the relevant terms in (4), canceling common terms from both sides of(4),
dividing both sides of(4) by a, and then letting

a

-+

0 yields the required differential equation. I get

Jlg'(i) - g"(i) • 1 .
2

(5)

From (5) and the fact that a Brownian motion process has independent and stationary increments, I
can infer that g(s)
g(s)

=

=

k •

S, for some constant k. Using g(s)

=

k • s in (5), I conclude that

k • S. The RA's objective, as expressed in (2), can now be written as

JDaX i [" •

s-I. N (8).

j {" {2"

(t- to)

r

exp [- {x-" (Ho)} '/2

,,'(t- to) jdoc ].

(6)

S-So

The first-order necessary condition is
OD

N(i*).

f

{aJ21t(t-to)flexp[-{x-Jl(t-to)}2/2a2(t-to)]dx •

i'-so

i*

IN (s'). {dId,;

'J {" {2"

(t- to)

t exp [- {x-" (t- to)} '/2 ,,'(t- to) 1doc} ,

s -so

jl' {"{2" r
l

N' (s').

(t- to)

exp [- {x -" (t- t o )}'/2

,,'(t- to) j doc ].

(7)

where s* solves (7). Equation (7) tells us that optimality requires the RA to set the quality standard
so that the long-run expected net social benefit from regulation (the LHS) equals a probabilistically
weighted sum of the marginal and total net benefit from regulation. When the quality standard is
chosen in this manner, the long-run expected net social benefit from regulation will have been
maximized.
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3. Conclusions and Extensions

In this paper I have provided a simple framework within which the task of optimal
environmental standard setting can be analyzed effectively. This framework does not assume the
existence of an exogenous standard; on the contrary, this framework endogenizes the task of optimal
standard setting. Further, the costibenefit aspect of the problem, and the fact that the RA's task
involves decision making in a dynamic and stochastic environment are explicitly modeled.
The simple framework presented in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In
what follows, I suggest two possible extensions. First, one could analyze a model in which the step
one and step two stages of the regulatory process have been combined. Such an integrated analysis
will enable us to have a better understanding of the costs and benefits of alternate forms of
environmental regulation, in a model with endogenous standard setting. Second, the RA's objective
need not involve expected net benefit maximization. Depending on the context, one could formulate
an objective which involves expected cost minimization. Finally, one could introduce learning into
the model. This will enable us to have a better understanding of the connections between optimal
standard setting and the temporal resolution of uncertainty.

7
References

Batabyal, AA (1995) ''Leading Issues in Domestic Environmental Regulation: A Review Essay."
Ecological Economics 12: 23-39.
Batabyal, A.A., and S.l Yoo. (1994) "Renewal Theory and Natural Resource Regulatory Policy
Under Uncertainty." Economics Letters 46: 237-41.
Cox, D.R., and H.D. Miller. (1965). The Theory of Stochastic Processes. Methuen: London,
England.
Cropper, M.L., and W.E. Oates. (1992) "Environmental Economics: A Survey." Journal of
Economic Literature 30: 675-740.
Fri, R.W. (1995) "Using Science Soundly: The Yucca Mountain Standard." Resources (120):
15-18.
Karlin, S., and H.M. Taylor. (1975) A First Course in Stochastic Processes, 2nd ed. New York:
Academic Press.
Oates, W.E., P.R. Portney, and A.M. McGartland. (1989) "The Net Benefits of Incentive Based
Regulation: A Case Study ofEnvironmental Standard Setting." American Economic Review
79: 1233-42.
Wolff, R.W. (1989) Stochastic Modeling and the Theory of Queues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.

